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Add a tag Cancel Be the first to add a tag for this edition. Lists What are lists? In the noncooperative approach, solutions are derived as equilibria of strategic models describing an underlying bargaining procedure. Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory provides the reader with an up-to-date survey of cooperative, axiomatic models of bargaining, starting with Nash's seminal paper, The Bargaining Problem. It presents an overview of the main results in this area during the past four decades.
Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory provides a chapter on noncooperative models of bargaining, in particular on those models leading to bargaining solutions that also result from the axiomatic approach. Web, Tablet. Content Protection. Flag as inappropriate.
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Book This book aims to present, in a unified approach, a series of mathematical results con cerning triangular norm-based measures and a class of cooperative games with Juzzy coalitions. Our approach intends to emphasize that triangular norm-based measures are powerful tools in exploring the coalitional behaviour in 'such games. They not and simplify some technical aspects of the already classical axiomatic the only unify ory of Aumann-Shapley values, but also provide new perspectives and insights into these results.
Moreover, this machinery allows us to obtain, in the game theoretical context, new and heuristically meaningful information, which has a significant impact on balancedness and equilibria analysis in a cooperative environment.
From a formal point of view, triangular norm-based measures are valuations on subsets of a unit cube [0, 1]X which preserve dual binary operations induced by trian gular norms on the unit interval [0, 1]. Triangular norms and their dual conorms are algebraic operations on [0,1] which were suggested by MENGER  and which proved to be useful in the theory of probabilistic metric spaces see also [WALD ]. Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations. Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations analyzes the organization of economic decision making in a contemporary setting.
The contributors focus on two important aspects of this analysis. First, they address the issue of imperfect or incomplete information and communication in economic organizations and consider imperfections arising from the interaction of the market organization with its environment. Second, the issue of cooperation in a competitive environment is thoroughly analyzed and alternative social trade organizations are designed to dissipate the allocation problems that arise in these situations.
Economic Exchange and Social Organization: The Edgeworthian foundations of general equilibrium theory. This book aims to develop an institutional approach to general economic equi librium. Thus far, institutional economics has essentially been confined to purely verbal discourse.
Here I argue the case that general equilibrium theory forms a well rounded basis for the development of an institutional economic the ory. The fundamental economic trade mechanism underlying this refocusing is that of the Edgeworthian barter mechanism modelled through the equilibrium notion of the core of an economy. There is an extensive literature that links the core with the Walrasian price mechanism, which is explored in this book.
Next I develop an alternative model of explicitly nonsovereign trade in the setting of an institutionally structured economy.
La Trobe University. Unions' relative concerns and strikes in wage bargaining. Anna Bogomolnaia. Ana Mauleon, Jose J. Epothilone lions and pdf Axiomatic projects.
In this book the core and several of its extensions are considered to be descriptions of the equilibrium allocations resulting from institutionalized barter processes, thereby providing a basis of an institutionally based economic theory. Traditionally finite economies have been assessed as the most natural represen tations of real life economies, in particular of market economies. Many funda mental insights have been developed.
In the first half of the book I summarize the most influential and important results in the literature on finite economies regarding the relationship of the Walrasian model of a perfectly competitive market system and the Edgeworthian theory of individually based, pure barter processes. I use the axiomatic method as the main methodological framework according to which I construct my models. Mathematical economics uses mathematical tools and reasoning to describe and explain economic reality.
At the core of mathematical economics is general equilibrium theory. Static and Dynamic Aspects of General Disequilibrium Theory describes and analyses various general equilibrium models, treating theory from an axiomatic point of view, which may lead to a deeper understanding of problems, may help to avoid incorrect reasoning, and may improve communication within the economic science.
This volume consists of four parts, each of which is self-contained. Part I deals with the mathematical and economic preliminaries.
Part II considers the static aspects of disequilibrium theory. Part III determines price rigidities endogenously. Finally, Part IV deals with dynamic aspects of disequilibrium theory. In six chapters this book introduces a micro-economic model where trade takes place through a stable structure of bilateral exchange institutions. The main problem in such models is that, for well-known equilibrium concepts, equilibrium may fail to exist in the corresponding game.
In this work an adaptation of such models - hierarchically structured economies - is introduced.